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Abstract:
After almost forty years, Robert Nozick’s seminal right-libertarian classic Anarchy, State,
and Utopia continues to stand at the center of much of the discussion regarding prop-
erty and its initial acquisition. Nozick’s most important contribution to that discussion
is the formulation of his entitlement theory. Although the theory has received nearly un-
paralleled attention, its interpreters have misunderstood and misappropriated its most
essential part: Nozick’s proviso. This paper presents a brief selection of the most rep-
resentative interpretations of Nozick’s proviso, criticizes them, offers a textually well
founded alternative reading of the proviso, and discusses its implications for Nozick’s
entitlement theory as well as right-libertarian theories of property more generally.
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1. Introduction
After almost forty years, Robert Nozick’s seminal right-libertarian classic Anar-
chy, State, and Utopia continues to stand at the center of much of the discus-
sion regarding property and its initial acquisition (Nozick 1974). Nozick’s most
important contribution to that discussion is the formulation of his entitlement
theory. Although the theory has received nearly unparalleled attention, its inter-
preters have misunderstood and misappropriated its most essential part: Noz-
ick’s proviso. This paper presents a brief selection of the most representative in-
terpretations of Nozick’s proviso, criticizes them, offers a textually well founded
alternative reading of the proviso, and discusses its implications for Nozick’s en-
titlement theory as well as right-libertarian theories of property more generally.
Nozick’s entitlement theory is essentially a theory of property and consists
of three principles. First, the “principle of justice in acquisition” speciﬁes how
initially unheld things can justly become held. Second, the “principle of justice
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in transfer” describes how a justly-held good can justly be transferred from one
person to another. Third, the “principle of rectiﬁcation” requires any violations
of the ﬁrst two principles to be rectiﬁed and spells out how this is to be done
(Nozick 1974, 151–152).
The most basic and at the same time most important principle regulates the
just acquisition of resources. While Nozick does not specify the precise details of
his principle of justice in acquisition, he is certain that any suitable such princi-
ple must include a proviso akin to a weak Lockean Proviso: “A process normally
giving rise to a permanent bequeathable property right in a previously unowned
thing will not do so if the position of others no longer at liberty to use the thing
is thereby worsened.” Nozick’s discussion of the proviso’s baseline—as compared
to which the worsening in question is measured—leaves much to be desired, al-
though the force of the proviso obviously hinges upon the interpretation of this
very baseline.
This discussion has inspired legions of authors who have—with few excep-
tions—criticized Nozick for his proviso. The proviso has largely been interpreted
as being altogether ineffectual at restricting the initial acquisition of natural re-
sources because of its supposedly low baseline. This has either led to calls to
abandon Nozick’s theory in its entirety—mainly because of its ostensibly harsh
implications for social justice—or to introduce far more restrictive provisos. To
buck this trend, section 2 presents a brief selection of low-baseline interpre-
tations of Nozick’s proviso that have led to this assessment and demonstrates
why they are false. Section 3 analyses and criticizes a very different proviso
interpretation with a high baseline before developing a new and textually well
founded reading. Section 4 discusses the implications of this reading for Nozick’s
entitlement theory, points towards potential ramiﬁcations for right-libertarian
theories, and concludes.
2. Provisos and Low Baselines
In the context of arguing in favor of the doctrine of communal holdings in land,
John Exdell construes Nozick’s interpretation of the Lockean Proviso as “inge-
niously avoid[ing]” the otherwise possibly severe restrictions placed on appro-
priation by Locke (Exdell 1977, 144). Exdell argues that there are two reasons
why the Nozickian Proviso offers little more than protection in case of catas-
trophe (such as a dramatic decline in the availability of basic commodities like
water) and otherwise leaves room for unlimited proﬁts from the exploitation of
the right to private property. First, private appropriation is assessed to be just
if it does not worsen the situation of others who are no longer at liberty to use
the resource in question. Second, this condition is seldom violated because it is
essentially guaranteed that a system of private property will leave people better
off than they would be if resources were unowned.
Leslie P. Francis and John G. Francis paint a similarly bleak picture of the
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lish the baseline against which one is to measure the above mentioned potential
worsening of others by means of property acquisition, the authors offer a more
detailed view than Exdell. Speciﬁcally, they suggest that Nozick favors a base-
line which is ﬁxed in time and represents “the situation before there were any
property rights at all” (Francis and Francis 1976, 640). Thus, an appropriation
is only said to harm a person if her position is more deprived than the position
of a similar person would have been at a time prior to the establishment of the
institution of property rights.
Michael Otsuka endorses a similar interpretation but puts less emphasis on
the baseline being ﬁxed in time. Rather, he claims that independent of time Noz-
ick’s proviso justiﬁes appropriation as long as it does not make anybody worse off
than she would have been if she were living in a society of hunters and gather-
ers (Otsuka 1998).1 If these standard interpretations of Nozick’s libertarianism
were correct, this would indeed have harsh implications for social justice be-
cause there would be little reason to suspect any redistributive consequences to
follow from Nozick’s entitlement theory. Rather, Nozick’s proviso would allow
for the almost unrestricted exploitation of natural resources for private gain.
The authors discussed above have pegged the baseline of Nozick’s principle
of justice in acquisition to either a point in time (pre-property), a type of society
(hunters and gatherers) or have more generally claimed that, due to the sig-
niﬁcant advantages of a system of private property, people living under it will
generally be better off rather than worse off.
The interpretation of the baseline being ﬁxed in time, advanced by Fran-
cis and Francis (1976), is highly questionable not only because it implicitly and
implausibly credits all elements of human progress (scientiﬁc, organizational,
etc.) to the establishment of private property, but also because it is textually
unfounded. In his discussion of the application of the proviso to cases of newly
discovered resources, Nozick explicitly states that while the discovery may jus-
tify an original appropriation of the resource, the resulting property right may be
weakened “as time passes, [because] the likelihood increases that others would
have come across the substance” (Nozick 1974, 181). Thus, in order to avoid
others falling below their baseline, Nozick advocates limiting the bequest of the
resource. This unequivocal reference to the baseline ﬂoating with respect to time
makes the hypothesis that it is ﬁxed with respect to time objectionable.
The alternative interpretation, put forward by Otsuka (1998), according to
which the baseline is ﬁxed to a type of society or to a speciﬁc use of the appro-
priated resource, such as hunting and gathering, is equally dubious. It has not
been demonstrated that unappropriated land cannot effectively be employed in
other enterprises—which would be necessary to justify anchoring the baseline
as it has been proposed. While this interpretation of the baseline is problematic,
its likely origin is easily traced, for it is probably the result of a misreading of
Nozick’s reply to Charles Fourier (see Nozick 1974, 178–179). Fourier contends
that, as civilization deprives people of the basic liberties to hunt, gather, and
1 It is debatable whether Otsuka envisions the baseline as also allowing for agrarian or other prim-
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herd animals, a society must compensate its members by means of a basic in-
come. Nozick disagrees and claims that this would only be justiﬁed for those
for whom the “process of civilization was a net loss” (Nozick 1974, 179). Thus,
Nozick’s reference to primitive uses stems from a related, but clearly distinct,
discussion. While for Fourier these basic uses were of central importance, there
is strong evidence that Nozick’s baseline properly takes into account more ad-
vanced uses—namely any use that does not require appropriation.
Textual evidence for Nozick’s envisioned baseline taking account of society’s
progress can be found in his discussion of patents. Nozick favors time limits on
patents, based on his conjecture that in the absence of the invention and after
some time others would probably have developed the same technology (Nozick
1974, 182). Thus, Nozick supports a baseline that adapts to progress in society
and to the general betterment of its members.
As introduced above, another common but troublesome interpretation of the
proviso, supported by Exdell (1977), suggests that rather than being geared to-
wards ensuring that individuals are not harmed, it is formulated with respect
to groups. Thus, arguments along the lines of ‘people generally being better off’
under a system of private property are meant to justify private property. To be
fair, Nozick himself draws upon arguments that appear to be aimed at defending
the system of private property on general grounds, such as its encouragement
of experimentation and the efﬁcient allocation of the means of production. How-
ever, Nozick is quick to assert that these claims about the general efﬁciency of
systems of private property enter his argument in order to show that the proviso
will be satisﬁed—because every single individual is better off due to the intro-
duction of private property—and “not as a utilitarian justiﬁcation of property”
(Nozick 1974, 177). This is essential because a utilitarian perspective would di-
rectly conﬂict with the self-ownership proviso and would go against the very es-
sentials of Nozick’s theory. Therefore, a group-based perspective on the proviso
is not only a misguided interpretation but also one that fundamentally conﬂicts
with Nozick’s general position.
3. Provisos and Elevated Baselines
Suggestions such as pegging the proviso’s baseline to a speciﬁc point in time and
resource usage or tying it to the welfare level experienced by groups have one
thing in common: They imply an inaccurately stringent interpretation of Noz-
ick’s proviso as well as accordingly low baselines. The great majority of Nozick’s
ﬁercest critics advance their arguments with the help of such low-lying base-
lines, so as to illustrate the despicable social consequences Nozick’s entitlement
theory triggers by supposedly forbidding any and all redistribution and welfare
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interpreters and critics, Gerald Allan Cohen (1986a, 123) puts forward an all too
lenient interpretation of Nozick’s proviso:2
“It requires of an appropriation of an object O, which was unowned
and available to all, that its withdrawal from general use does not
make anyone’s prospects worse than they would have been had O re-
mained in general use. If no one’s position is in any way made worse
than it would have been had O remained unowned, then, of course,
the proviso is satisﬁed. But it is also satisﬁed when someone’s posi-
tion is in some relevant way worsened, as long as his position is in
other ways sufﬁciently improved to counterbalance that worsening.
Hence I appropriate something legitimately if and only if no one has
any reason to prefer its remaining in general use, or whoever does
have some reason to prefer that gets something in the new situation
which he did not have before and which is worth at least as much to
him as what I have caused him to lose.”
This understanding of the proviso’s baseline implies that each and every appro-
priation is only just if it either does not worsen anybody’s position or if it ‘pays its
way’ by generating beneﬁts for the new owner by which those who were harmed
will then be compensated.
How would this play out in practice? Let us entertain a thought-experiment:
In a three-person world, both Person A and Person B had ample opportunities
to further their logging business by acquiring forests without thereby worsening
the position of anybody. As Person C grows tired of the high price of timber, she
contemplates claiming an unowned forest or two for herself in order to enter the
business. Predictably, this will lower the price of timber and the proﬁts of A and
B to an extent that cannot be compensated by C.
Is C justiﬁed in her planned acquisition? According to the above interpre-
tation of Nozick’s proviso, she is certainly not, for her actions would be to the
detriment of A and B while failing to create value sufﬁcient to offer suitable
compensation.
However, this result stands in obvious contrast to Nozick’s understanding
of justice in acquisition, as he goes out of his way to emphasize that what is
meant by “worsening the situation of others [...] does not include how I ‘worsen’
a seller’s position if I appropriate materials to make some of what he is selling
and then enter into competition with him” (Nozick 1974, 178). Thus, according
2 While Cohen’s interpretation of Nozick’s proviso may be too lenient and may imply a baseline
that is too high, it is important to note that (a) Nozick’s treatment of his principle of justice in
acquisition lacks expository clarity, thereby inviting confusion, and that (b) the argument Cohen
builds on his interpretation does not depend on this difference. His claims that Nozick arbitrarily
excludes other suitable baselines from consideration and that any proviso-style determination—of
what a legitimate acquisition is—will run into trouble remain untouched (see Cohen 1986a, 126–
133.) After presenting the above discussed proviso interpretation, Cohen addresses the question
of how Nozick would analyse the justice of an already existing system of private property in its
entirety. Here Cohen refers to a proviso interpretation similar to the one I claim should be used
to analyse the justice of any and all appropriations within a Nozickian system.210 Joachim Wündisch
to Nozick, C would be well justiﬁed in her plans to acquire forests in order to
enter the logging business.
The stark differences between Nozick’s actual position on justice in acquisi-
tion and Cohen’s interpretation of it are indicative of strongly diverging read-
ings of Nozick’s proviso. These differences go beyond the speciﬁc deﬁnition of
and exceptions to the term ‘worsening’ as it is applied by Nozick. While Co-
hen apparently thinks that the effects of any acquisition are to be assessed
by comparing the actual post-acquisition situation to the situation that would
have developed in the absence of that particular acquisition, Nozick compares
the actual post-acquisition situation to the counterfactual situation that would
have developed had no acquisition—neither the speciﬁc one in question nor any
other—ever taken place.3 Thus, Cohen’s interpretation implies that any acqui-
sition must have a neutral or positive effect on all those affected. In contrast,
Nozick accepts that an individual acquisition may make a person worse off as
compared to the situation that would have developed in the absence of the spe-
ciﬁc acquisition as long as that person draws a net-beneﬁt from the system of
private property as a whole or all acquisitions taken together respectively.
To illustrate this point, let us return to our three-person world where A and
B dominate the logging industry while C contemplates entering the market. C
goes ahead with the acquisition of two unowned forests adjacent to the plots
owned by A and B. However, instead of going into business, C simply fences
off her forests and builds a shack in view of her neighbors. Now A and B can
no longer enjoy the pristine wilderness in their vicinity and must endure the
sight of C’s shack from their verandas. Given that C offers no compensation, her
acquisition would be deemed unjust according to Cohen’s interpretation of Noz-
ick’s proviso. However, given that A and B are still considerably better off than
they would be in the absence of any acquisition (including their own), Nozick’s
principle of justice in acquisition pronounces C’s actions to be legitimate.
This comparison raises interesting issues for any property rights theorist.
Assume that C’s acquisition is justiﬁed as long as A and B continue to incur a
net-beneﬁt from the institution of property rights. Then it would seem to be the
case that the extent to which C’s acquisition is allowed to worsen the situation
of A and B (as compared to the situation immediately preceding her acquisition)
is only limited by the advantages A and B draw from their own acquisitions and
the system of private property at large. However, as I want to illustrate, this is
an illusion: An additional limit is set by the property rights of A and B.
Consider C’s alternative plans. (1) C plans to acquire the forests not in order
to build a shack but to construct a mansion, thereby obstructing the views from
3 At times Cohen does not distinguish sufﬁciently clearly between a counterfactual analysis as pro-
posed by Nozick (comparing an actual post-acquisition situation to a counterfactual situation) and
a temporal analysis (comparing an actual post-acquisition situation to an actual pre-acquisition
situation). For example, Cohen (1986a, 123) claims that an appropriation may be legitimate if a
person “gets something in the new situation which he did not have before”. This temporal compar-
ison of the pre- and post-acquisition situation stands in obvious contrast to Nozick’s intentions.
Therefore, and because Cohen usually presumes a counterfactual analysis, I interpret his overall
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the adjacent plots owned by A and B. (2) C additionally plans to enjoy her man-
sion by playing music very loudly—every night. A and B would have to invest in
soundprooﬁng to be able to sleep. (3) In addition, C plans to uproot all the trees
in her forest to burn them in her private power plant. As a result, air pollution
would skyrocket, killing many of the trees owned by A and B.
Given that A and B are still better off than they would be had nobody ever
acquired anything, one may be tempted to conclude that according to Nozick’s
principle of justice in acquisition any of C’s plans (1–3) are justiﬁed. At least
C’s more egregious ideas to further her own welfare are not just, simply because
they violate the property rights of others. The difﬁculties associated with deter-
mining which ways of utilizing one’s property are legitimate and which ways of
utilizing it infringe upon the rights of others, is a challenging question within
the context of Nozick’s, or any, theory of property rights. However, these difﬁ-
culties do not stem from the workings of Nozick’s proviso but from the precise
deﬁnition and strength of any particular property right. Thus, limits to acquisi-
tion and subsequent use are not only demarcated by Nozick’s principle of justice
in acquisition but also by existing rights to property.
This interdependence of the justice in acquisition of a piece of property and
its subsequent use is central to the differences between Cohen’s and Nozick’s
views on Nozick’s proviso. Cohen’s own example (1986a, 123–124) of an appro-
priate acquisition of a beach is well suited to demonstrate these differences as
well as the difﬁculties of Cohen’s account:
“I enclose the beach, which has been common land, declare it my
own, and announce a price of one dollar per person per day for the
use of it [...]. But I so enhance the recreational value of the beach
(perhaps by dyeing the sand different attractive colours, or just by
picking up the litter every night) that all would-be users of it regard
a dollar [...] for a day’s use of it as a dollar well spent: they prefer
a day at the beach as it now is in exchange for a dollar to a free
day at the beach as it was and as it would have remained had no
one appropriated it. Hence my appropriation of the beach satisﬁes
Nozick’s proviso.”
Cohen is correct in his assessment that the above acquisition would satisfy Noz-
ick’s proviso. However, he is incorrect to imply that a similar acquisition of a
less well-intentioned capitalist would not satisfy Nozick’s proviso. Suppose the
would-be owner of the beach intends to charge three dollars per day for access to
the beach, which is a whooping one dollar more than the maximum two dollars
the would-be users are willing to pay. Would this acquisition be justiﬁed? Ac-
cording to Cohen’s criterion it would be unjust because all would-be users have a
reason to prefer for the beach to remain in general use but no beneﬁt—stemming
from that particular acquisition—that would compensate them. However, as
long as no property rights are infringed and all would-be users are still better
off with the system of private property in place, Nozick would judge differently.212 Joachim Wündisch
This difference in judgment is, as discussed earlier, a matter of relying on a
different baseline when assessing whether the proviso has been violated. Co-
hen’s example of a commercially used beach provides an excellent opportunity
to argue why the proviso I attribute to Nozick—in contrast to the proviso Cohen
attributes to him—captures Nozick’s intentions:
One of Nozick’s arguments underscoring his interpretation of the principle
of justice in acquisition relates to the “familiar social considerations favoring
private property” (Nozick 1974, 177). According to Nozick, his proviso would
not be violated by the appropriation of private property, as people beneﬁt from
a system of private property because, for example, “[...] it increases the social
product by putting means of production in the hands of those who can use them
most efﬁciently [...]”. Importantly, in Nozick´s argument this claim does not
serve as a utilitarian justiﬁcation of private property. Nozick merely wants to
make plausible that his proviso will not be violated. This non-violation of the
proviso—and not the positive social implications of private property—is meant
to justify acquisitions.
While the claim that all individuals beneﬁt from a system of private prop-
erty can be debated, it would be absurd to claim that all individuals beneﬁt
from—or at least are not harmed by—each and every appropriation as it would
be required by Cohen’s interpretation of Nozick’s proviso. Thus, there are two
reasons to reject Cohen’s interpretation. First, Nozick believes that in practice a
market economy will not violate his proviso. Taken together with Cohen’s inter-
pretation of Nozick’s proviso this would imply that Nozick must have assumed
that nobody is being harmed by any individual acquisition. As alluded to above,
this is an exceedingly strong claim, and even though Nozick is notorious for
strong claims it would be a gross violation of the principle of charity to attribute
this claim to Nozick. Therefore, Cohen’s interpretation stands in stark contrast
to what Nozick argues for: the non-violation of his proviso in practice.
Second, it is illuminating to consider how Nozick argues for this non-violation
of his proviso. Much can be said about the “familiar social considerations favor-
ing private property”, and many free market theorists would surely want to
argue that in general private property causes people to be much better off (Noz-
ick 1974, 177). Some may even want to make the case that everybody is made
better off or—at the very least—not harmed by the free market and the pri-
vate property upon which it builds. However, the case that nobody is harmed by
any individual acquisition because of the “familiar social considerations favoring
private property” is even more outlandish than the simple claim that “nobody is
harmed by any individual acquisition” (Nozick 1974, 177).
This is so because the general social advantages of private property are well
suited to support arguments based on how well off people are on average in a
system that allows for the private appropriation of property. (Such an argument
is based on the advantage of the average acquisition for the average person.
This is the utilitarian argument.) Less convincingly, general social advantages
may also be employed to support arguments based on how well off every speciﬁc
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an argument is based on the advantage of the average acquisition for every
speciﬁc person. This is Nozick’s argument.) However, general social advantages
cannot successfully be employed to support arguments based on how well off
every speciﬁc person is made by every speciﬁc acquisition in a system that allows
for the private appropriation of property. (Such an argument is based on the
advantage of every speciﬁc acquisition for every speciﬁc person. This is the
argument Cohen implicitly but erroneously attributes to Nozick.)4
Why can general social advantages of private property not be used to make
claims about the beneﬁts received by speciﬁc persons from speciﬁc acquisitions?
It lies in the very nature of the free market that the distribution of the social
advantages emanating from private property is widely dispersed and hard to
predict. Some inventions pan out, some industries ﬂourish, and others gobble
up resources only to fail in the process. To employ arguments about social advan-
tages of private property with respect to individuals and individual acquisitions,
as described above, is akin to being in total denial about the workings on the
free market. Accordingly, it is reasonable to assume that Nozick has a different
baseline in mind when he assesses the justiﬁcation of an appropriation.
As discussed in the context of Cohen’s beach example, the differences be-
tween Nozick’s and Cohen’s approach are signiﬁcant not only on a theoretical
but also on a practical level. However, they become much more pronounced when
one is not merely assessing the justiﬁcation of a single acquisition but that of a
whole group of them or even that of a system of private property. What are the
relations between a single appropriation, a group of appropriations, and a sys-
tem of private property? This question is pertinent, as some authors—including
Cohen (1986a, 130–134)—have put forward the idea that Nozick uses different
provisos when evaluating the justice of a single acquisition and the justice of a
system of private property. Also speaking of a system of private property being
the sum of all acquisitions is common.
A group of appropriations is the sum of a number of individual acquisitions.
A system of private property is made up of the social norms or legal rules that
govern the use of property in a society which adheres to such a system. There-
fore, a system of private property is not the sum of the acquisitions justiﬁed by
it or made under its auspices in a particular society or region. Consider a world
in which—according to the system of private property entailed in Nozick’s en-
titlement theory—no person is justiﬁed in making an acquisition because, for
4 The gist of my argument is this: Cohen’s position is false because it implicitly attributes to Nozick
a false belief and an absurd argument. Two critiques of my argument may come to mind: (a) Given
that false beliefs and absurd arguments are common, how can this be the basis of a sound line of
reasoning? (b) Given that this paper builds on the belief that certain key arguments of Nozick are
actually false, how can Cohen be criticized for potentially recognizing different instances of the
same problem? Of course I do not intend to claim that any interpretation is false simply because
it claims to recognize especially egregious mistakes in somebody else´s work. However, if those
supposed mistakes can easily be avoided by a more charitable—and textually better founded—
interpretation, that road should be taken. Where I criticize Nozick throughout this paper, I take
those critiques to be inescapable in that Nozick’s work does not allow for an interpretation that
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example, the world is simply too small. If the people living in this world accept
Nozick’s rules, the world features a system of private property but not a single
acquisition it could be made up of.
Although a private property system is not the sum of all acquisitions made
under its auspices, it remains to consider whether different provisos may suit-
ably be used to judge on a single acquisition and a system of private property.
A system of private property may exist in the absence of any acquisition. How-
ever, any single private acquisition presupposes the existence of a system of
private property. Therefore, in order to justify the ﬁrst acquisition it is neces-
sary to have justiﬁed or to be simultaneously justifying the system of private
property which defends the acquisition. Accordingly, an individual acquisition
and a system of private property may be judged on by two different provisos, but
a one-step justiﬁcation of a single acquisition must always include a justiﬁcation
of the underlying system.
For Nozick a person living in a free-market society may be severely restricted
in his choices of where to go, which resources to use, and how to earn a living. As
long as the system of private property does not make him worse off on the whole,
the individual acquisitions within the property system are justiﬁed. In Cohen’s
interpretation every individual acquisition must have—at least—a neutral ef-
fect on everybody. However, many private acquisitions do signiﬁcantly more
than that and offer net-advantages to others. An example is the privatized and
subsequently enhanced beach in Cohen’s original story.
To make these widespread advantages of the acquisitions of others plausi-
ble, it is illustrative to consider how they can be measured. Economists use the
concept of ‘consumer surplus’ to refer to “the difference between the maximum
amount a consumer is willing to pay for a good and the amount he must actually
pay to purchase the good in the marketplace” (Besanko and Braeutigam 2002,
185; see also Rosen 2002, 49–50). In this context, property rights are taken
as given and, therefore, potential disadvantages resulting from the acquisition
that have made the production of the good in question possible are disregarded.
Thus, the idea of consumer surplus can only serve as one part of a measurement
of the net-advantages to others caused by any given acquisition.5 Speciﬁcally,
these net-advantages to others amount to the consumer surplus minus any dis-
5 Inspired by Nozick’s question of whether “the situation of persons who are unable to appropriate
[...] [is] worsened by a system allowing appropriation and permanent property?” it has become
common in debates on Nozick’s proviso to focus on the effects acquisitions have on non-owners,
in order to determine whether the proviso is violated (Nozick 1974, 177; see also Cohen 1986a,
130). If we assume that owners can never be disadvantaged by the acquisitions of others, to
such an extent that they no longer receive a net-beneﬁt from the system of private property,
this focus is justiﬁed. However, important questions such as whether it is just to acquire all the
drinkable water in the world illustrate that non-owners are not the only ones potentially harmed
by the acquisitions of others. Nevertheless, for ease of use and in line with established practice
this paper often refers to the effects an acquisition may have on non-owners, even though—in
principle—any other person may be negatively affected, which in turn could trigger a violation of
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advantages caused by the appropriation.6 In Cohen’s original beach example
the net-beneﬁt to others is equal or greater to zero because the consumer sur-
plus of the offer to use the enhanced beach outweighs any disadvantages from
appropriation to the would-be user.
This simple calculation sheds light on why Cohen’s interpretation of Nozick’s
proviso and Nozick’s actual position drift further and further apart the more
appropriations are to be evaluated. Consider a world in which—as the ﬁrst
appropriation ever—a beach has just been acquired, enhanced, and rented out
to users. In assessing whether that appropriation was justiﬁed, Cohen’s and
Nozick’s applications of the proviso return the same result. This is so because in
the absence of that very ﬁrst appropriation no acquisition—neither the speciﬁc
one in question nor any other—would ever have taken place. Therefore, there is
no difference between Cohen’s baseline of how well off people would have been
in the absence of that speciﬁc appropriation and Nozick’s baseline of how well
off people would have been in the absence of any appropriation.
Now, consider instead a world in which the beach-enhancement acquisition
described above is not the ﬁrst but the last acquisition—following a long line of
appropriations that have created signiﬁcant amounts of consumer surplus for
most people. Now Cohen’s and Nozick’s baselines are strikingly different. For
Cohen the net-beneﬁts that non-owners derive from the previous acquisitions
of owners effectively raise the baseline against which any worsening—caused
by the beach acquisition—is measured. For Nozick the baseline remains the
situation that would have developed in the absence of the introduction of private
property.
After the institution of private property is ﬁrst developed, crowding is un-
heard of and unowned land is ubiquitous. Thus, negative effects of early ac-
quisitions are unlikely. Accordingly, any appropriated land that is later used
commercially creates consumer surplus without generating negative externali-
ties which, therefore, leads to a net-beneﬁt for others. Therefore, the application
of Cohen’s approach to later acquisitions assumes a signiﬁcantly higher baseline
than Nozick would approve of and consequently makes it more likely that the
proviso is violated.
Assuming that some percentage of acquisitions create a net-beneﬁt for oth-
ers, this effect is ampliﬁed the more acquisitions are individuated. If the beach
enhancer chooses to acquire the beach in many segments consecutively, rather
than all at once, his acquisition of the ﬁnal piece of land will be measured against
a higher baseline. People can already enjoy a large section of the enhanced beach
6 Consumer surplus is not the only kind of beneﬁt to bystanders that can result from an acquisition.
Without entering in a commercial exchange you may simply be pleased by the beautiful home your
neighbor has built or the pasture she lets you share on her newly acquired property. However,
the majority of beneﬁts we receive from the acquisitions of others in a system of private property
can be classiﬁed under the heading of consumer surplus. For why should an acquirer exclude you
from the beneﬁts of her land if not to either keep them for herself or share them with you at a
price? However, for a more universal approach ‘general beneﬁts’ can be used in lieu of ‘consumer
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and may view the acquisition of the last parcel of pristine beach to be to their
detriment.
The decision to acquire natural resources in aggregate rather than individu-
ally has similar effects. The would-be beach enhancer may be tempted to acquire
an adjacent oil well but knows that this acquisition would fail Cohen’s test by
making some people worse off. However, he also knows that the same people
would beneﬁt from his beach-enhancing activities to such an extent as to out-
weigh any harm done by the acquisition of the oil well. The simple solution
to pass Cohen’s test is, of course, to acquire the entire area encompassing the
beach and the oil well at one stroke.7 This inconsistency between the evalu-
ations of one large or many small appropriations—that in sum encompass the
same area—again shows that Cohen’s lenient interpretation of Nozick’s proviso
is ﬂawed. It is ﬂawed in and of itself but, because it is unnecessarily ﬂawed, it
is also an inferior interpretation of Nozick’s proviso.
4. The Baseline of Nozick’s Proviso and Its Implications
As argued above, the baseline of Nozick’s proviso is best understood as the hy-
pothetical position speciﬁc individuals would have been in had no acquisitions
ever taken place. As applied to a system of property rights, the central question
is akin to Nozick’s reply to Fourier: “For whom—if for anybody—is the system of
private property a net loss?” (Nozick 1974, 178–179) Importantly, this individ-
ualistic baseline is neither ﬁxed with respect to time or speciﬁc resource usage
nor is it meant to assess the position of groups. Thus, in this hypothetical world
individuals are free to make the best use of unowned resources and expected to
proﬁt from their scientiﬁc and organizational advances.
According to Nozick, any society that is not organized based on the entitle-
ment theory is laden with injustices that require rectiﬁcation. These injustices
can occur either due to violations of the principle of justice in transfer or the
principle of justice in acquisition. Violations of the principle of justice in trans-
fer are triggered by involuntary transfers as ubiquitous as theft. While some
of them raise their own intricate challenges worth pursuing, they are not the
subject of this paper. Violations of the principle of justice in acquisition are mea-
sured with regard to the proviso.
Having answered the question of the correct interpretation of Nozick’s pro-
viso and its baseline, it remains to discuss under what practical circumstances
that baseline may be violated: Whereas much speaks for the superiority of a
system of private property in producing high average incomes, it is—given the
destitution and poverty capitalism fails to avert—much less clear whether there
are not a signiﬁcant number of people who would have been likely to fare better
if natural resources were unowned.
7 These considerations make obvious that the acts of acquisition, transfer, and subsequent use are
hopelessly intertwined and, therefore, cannot—and should not—be evaluated independently of
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To whom this appears counterintuitive may want to consider the case of the
unemployed non-owners in Nozick’s minimal state. After any and all natural
resources have been acquired, the unemployed non-owners are neither able to
feed themselves—be it from activities such as hunting or gathering or any other
form of value creation possible in the absence of property rights—nor are they
in a position to trade their talents for any of the resources essential for survival.
Given that market economies are vulnerable to structural unemployment, it is
likely that many people are unemployed for long periods of time (see Abel and
Bernanke 2001, 94–96). Without access to natural resources, savings, unem-
ployment insurance, or the provisions of a welfare state those unemployed are
likely to be very badly off—worse off than they would have been had private
property not been created.
The comparative hardship of these people would probably create instances
of the violation of the proviso and, therefore, in accordance with the principle of
rectiﬁcation, call for compensatory payments in the form of redistribution from
owners to non-owners.
This judgment obviously depends on potentially controversial empirical as-
sumptions regarding the connection between the introduction of property rights,
human development, and individual welfare. The reliance on empirical assump-
tions is unavoidable because any proviso compares an actual state of affairs—
with private property rights—to a speciﬁc counterfactual or historic state of af-
fairs. As these empirical assumptions are also necessary to make the theoretical
differences between the discussed provisos practically relevant, it is informative
to ﬂesh them out in some detail and to use that opportunity to differentiate
between the provisos on a practical level.
Proviso interpretations that feature a reference to a speciﬁc time—such as
“the situation before there were any property rights at all”—ask whether the
situation of a speciﬁc person in a world with private property rights is worse
than the situation of a similar person would have been prior to the establish-
ment of property rights (Francis and Francis 1976, 640). Whether this proviso
is ever violated, crucially depends on the assumptions made about that time
prior to the establishment of property rights. If it is assumed that that time
was sufﬁciently retched, then such a time dependent proviso is almost never
violated. The practical difference between this proviso and the one I propose de-
pends on the assumption that time is a positive factor in human development.
History vindicates that assumption.
Proviso interpretations that ﬁx the relevant baseline to a speciﬁc resource
usage such as hunting and gathering ask whether the situation of a speciﬁc per-
son in a world with private property rights is worse than the situation of the
person living in a society of hunters and gatherers (see Otsuka, 1998). Mak-
ing this proviso operational requires assumptions about the realities of life in
societies that use resources in such a limited fashion. The practical difference
between a proviso that pegs the baseline to a speciﬁc type of society and the
proviso I propose depends on the assumption that, even in the absence of prop-
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claimed in section two of this paper, unappropriated land may well be used for
purposes other than hunting and gathering. A simplistic strategy to refute this
claim assumes that any activity other than hunting and gathering implies ac-
quisition. A more formidable challenge questions whether, once overcrowding
sets in, any more advanced ways of utilization would (continue to) be possible.
However, as supporting the growth of a population up to that point itself re-
quires more efﬁcient ways of utilizing natural resources, the objection also runs
into trouble. Nevertheless, it is up to debate what exactly these more advanced
ways of utilization may be, how they affect individual wellbeing, and how they,
therefore, speciﬁcally affect the practical implications of the proviso.
Provisos that are meant to assess the position of groups ask whether the situ-
ation of people in a world with private property rights is worse than the situation
of people in a world without any property rights. The application of such a pro-
viso relies on assumptions about the human development that is possible in the
absence of property rights. The crucial difference between such a proviso and
the proviso I propose is that the focus on groups allows to brush over individual
hardship. Practically, it is much more likely that people in general are better off
due to a system of private property than it is that each individual is better off
due to such a system. This claim does not even depend on speciﬁc assumptions
about property rights but merely on the differences among humans. There are
few dramatic changes—be it in the political, economic, or societal realm—that
do not create winners and losers.
The proviso of which I argue that it is the correct interpretation of the Noz-
ickian proviso sets as its baseline the hypothetical position speciﬁc individuals
would have been in had no acquisitions ever taken place. Importantly, this base-
line is understood to be individualistic and neither ﬁxed with respect to time or
speciﬁc resources usage. Making this proviso operational requires the construc-
tion of the relevant counterfactual situation. One way of doing this would be
to ask how a highly developed modern society were to change if one was to re-
move all property rights. Little imagination is required to understand that this
removal of property rights would lead to chaos and consequently much reduced
levels of wellbeing for—almost—everyone. As alluded to above, the main chaos
inducing ingredient in this situation would be the high population density made
possible by modern societies. More plausibly, what is needed is an understand-
ing of how societies would have developed in the absence of property rights and
how this development would in turn have affected wellbeing. Fleshing out this
counterfactual situation in detail is obviously well beyond the scope of this paper
and possibly even beyond the scope of philosophical analysis.
A more expansive study would also need to consider the non-identity prob-
lem (see Kavka 1982 and Parﬁt 1984). Central parts of Nozick’s theory rely
on welfare comparisons and a view of compensation that make it susceptible to
the Non-Identity Problem. This problem arises whenever an allegedly harm-
ful act directly or indirectly triggers the conception of a supposedly harmed
person. According to Nozick—and the conventional understanding of harm—
determining that such a person was indeed harmed requires establishing thatNozick’s Proviso: Misunderstood and Misappropriated 219
the person would have been better off in the absence of said act. However, as
the person would not even have existed in the absence of that act, the necessary
welfare comparison becomes unintelligible. Therefore, Nozick’s dependence on
such comparisons becomes a liability. Needless to say, a consideration of the
non-identity problem is also well beyond the scope of this paper.
However, I argue that already the preliminary perspective on the Nozickian
Proviso presented here not only yields a coherent and textually well-founded
interpretation of that proviso and its baseline but also an improved understand-
ing of what the practical implications of such a proviso are. The interpreta-
tion puts on display a right-libertarian entitlement theory with redistributive
consequences. As discussed above, this redistribution becomes necessary due
to the plight of the unemployed non-owners in Nozick’s minimal state. The
extent of that redistribution and, in particular, the potential level of welfare
associated with the above baseline is best analyzed by a detailed construction
of the relevant counterfactual and by means of economic theory. Even though
these social policy details cannot be developed here, the new proviso interpreta-
tion casts Nozick’s entitlement theory in a different light and raises the ques-
tion of what this implies for right-libertarian theories of property more gener-
ally. If Nozickian right-libertarianism has redistributive consequences, being
a right-libertarian should no longer be understood as claiming that redistribu-
tion is per se illegitimate. Most notably, political references to Nozick’s right-
libertarianism as a defense of a society free of taxation and redistribution would
be misguided. Answers to these important theoretical as well as practical ques-
tions are well worth further research.
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